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pacthe17

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This article, “Pacific Theatre Part 17: Manila,” by [Lestrade aka Unpopular Opinion], published on [July 14, 2023], questions the official narrative of the [WWII] Pacific Theatre campaign in the Philippines, focusing on the Battle of Luzon and the Battle of Manila. The author expresses skepticism about the reported troop numbers, casualty figures, and the extent of Japanese defensive preparations, particularly the alleged lack of extensive underground tunnel networks.

The text begins by referencing a previous discussion about fake OSS naval battle footage. It then skips ahead to the Luzon campaign, where the ONI is accused of orchestrating a narrative. The author questions the strategy of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, who allegedly split his 262,000 troops into three groups: the Kembu Group (30,000), Shimbu Group (80,000), and Shobu Group (152,000), with most troops supposedly hiding in the mountains rather than defending Manila. The article highlights the discrepancy between the large Japanese force and the relatively low American casualties, suggesting that most Japanese soldiers died from starvation and disease, or that the numbers themselves are fabricated.

The author delves into the Kembu Group, led by Rikichi Tsukada, noting that its 30,000 men were “annihilated” without much detail, and questioning the existence of tunnels under Clark Field. The article then examines the Shimbu Group, led by Shizuo Yokoyama, again questioning the troop numbers (stated as 80,000 but later 40,000 and then 30,000 for its sub-groups). A significant portion of the narrative focuses on the Battle of Wawa Dam and Ipo Dam, questioning the strategic importance of Wawa Dam and the Japanese defense of it. The author suggests that the Japanese forces were entombed in tunnels using TNT supplied by the Acme Corporation. The article also questions the motives behind the hurried capture of Ipo Dam, linking it to Lt. Gen. George Kenney’s desire for a swimming pool.

The Shobu Group, the largest contingent under Yamashita, is discussed next. The author questions the low number of Japanese casualties (around 2,000 killed) reported in the Battle of Baguio, despite Yamashita’s supposed 152,000 troops. The author suggests that supply lines were cut, leading to starvation, but again questions the logistics and the survival of 50,500 men reported to be with Yamashita at the surrender. The article also touches upon the Battle of the Irisan River, Battle of Bessang Pass, and Battle of Balete Pass, noting similar discrepancies in reported numbers and casualties. The author expresses suspicion regarding photographic evidence from Baguio, suggesting staged scenes and a lack of human life in post-battle images.

The narrative then shifts to the Manila Massacre and the Battle of Manila, focusing on Rear Admiral Sanji Iwabuchi, who allegedly defied Yamashita’s orders and held Manila to the death with approximately 16,000 men (later reduced to 6,000). The author questions Iwabuchi’s existence and backstory, as well as the plausibility of the atrocities attributed to the Japanese forces. The article scrutinizes the claims of massacres at specific locations like San Juan de Dios Hospital, Santa Rosa College, and various churches, arguing that these buildings were destroyed earlier or that the accounts are fabricated.

The author heavily criticizes the book “The Battle for Manila” by James M. Scott, labeling its prose as “retarded emotional” and its content as improbable and invented. The article points out that the reported destruction of Manila was largely due to American artillery and bombing, with the author suggesting that American tactics may have caused 40 percent of Filipino civilian deaths. The text also raises doubts about the photographic evidence of Intramuros post-battle, suggesting it might be a scale model or a composite of ruins.

Finally, the author concludes that the Luzon campaign and Battle of Manila narratives are not credible, suggesting that the American forces may have used the conflict as an opportunity to smuggle valuables and that the “Manila Massacre” was propaganda to portray the Americans as saviors and secure future influence and resources in the Philippines. The article ends with a promise of more to come, including the showdown at Okinawa.

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